+ Report of Congressional Committees on the Iran-Contra Affair
100th Congress, 1st Session
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
with
Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views
November 1987
H. Rept. No 100-433 S. Rept. No. 100-216
U.S. House of Representatives U.S. Senate Select Committee
Select Committee to Investigate On Secret Military Assistance to Iran
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran And the Nicaraguan Opposition
- Preface - Orgins of This Report
+ Section I: The Report
+ Part I Executive Summary
Executive Summary..3
Summary of the Facts..3
Nicaragua..3
Iran..6
The Coverup..9
Findings & Conclusions..11
Policy Contradictions & Failures..11
Flawed Policy Process..12
Confusion..13
╤The President first told the Tower Board that he had approved the initial Israeli shipments. Then, he told the Tower Board that he had not. Finally, he told the Tower Board that he does not know whether he approved the initial Israeli arms shipments, and his top advisers disagree on the question.
╤The President claims he does not recall signing a Finding approving the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran. But Poindexter testified that the President did sign a Finding on December 5, 1985 approving the shipment retroactively. Poindexter later destroyed the Finding to save the President from embarassment.
╤The President and the Attorney General told the public that the President did not know about the November 1985 Israeli HAWK shipment until February 1986╤an error the White House Chief of Staff explained by saying that the preparation for the press conference "sort of confused the Presidential mind."
╤North says he sent five or six sompleted memorandums to Poindexter seeking the President's approval for the diversion. Poindexter does not remember receiving any. Only one has been found.
Dishonesty & Secrecy..13
North admitted that he and other officials lied repeatedly to Congress and to the American people about the Contra covert action and Iran arms sales, and that he altered and destroyed official documents. North's testimony demonstrates that he also lied to members of the Executive branch, including the Attorney General, and officials of the State Department, CIA and NSC. Secrecy became an obsession. Congress was never informed of the Iran or the Contra covert actions, notwithstanding the requirement in the law that Congress be notified of all covert actions in a "timely fashion."
Poindexter and North cited fear of leaks as a justification for these practices. But the need to prevent public disclosure cannot justify the deception practiced upon Members of Congress and Executive branch officials by those who knew of the arms sales to Iran and of the Contra support network. ... Congress cannot fulfill its legislative responsibilities if it is denied information because members of the Executive branch, who place their faith in a band of international arms merchants and financiers, unilaterally declare Congress unworthy of trust.
It was not operational security that motivated such conduct╤not when our own Government was the victim. Rather, the NSC staff feared, correctly, that any disclosure to Congress or the Cabinet of the arms-for-hostages and arms-for-profit activities would produce a storm of outrage.
The Administration never sought to hide its desire to assist the Contras so long as such aid was authorized by statute. On the contrary, it wanted the Sandinistas to know that the United States supported the Contras. After enactment of the Boland Amendment, the Administration repeatedly and publicly called upon Congress to resume U.S. assistance. Only the NSC staff's Contra support activities were kept under wraps. The Committees believe these actions were concealed in order to prevent Congress from learning that the Boland Amendment was being circumvented.
Privitization..15
... Funds denied by Congress were obtained by the Administration from third countries and private citizens. The solicitation of foreign funds by an Administration to pursue foreign policy goals rejected by Congress is dangerous and improper. Moreover, under the Constitution only Congress can provide funds for the Executive branch. The Framers intended Congress's "power of the purse" to be one of the principal checks on Executive action. It was designed, among other things, to prevent the Executive from involving this country unilaterally in a foreign conflict. The Constitutional plan does not prohibit a President from asking a foreign state, or anyone else, to contribute funds to a third party. But it does prohibit such solicitation where the United States exercises control over their receipt and expenditure. By circumventing Congress' power of the purse through third-country and private contributions to the Contras, the Administration undermined a cardinal principle of the Constitution.
Covert operations of this Government should only be directed and conducted by the trained professional services that are accountable to the President and Congress. Such operations should never be delegated, as they were here, to private citizens in order to evade Governmental restrictions.
Lack of Accountability..16
Intelligence Abuses..17
Covert Operations..17
The NSC Staff..17
Disdain for Law..18
In the Iran-Contra Affair, officials viewed the law not as setting boundaries for their actions, but raising impediments to their goals.
╤The covert program of support for the Contras evaded the Constitution's most significant check on Executive power: the President can spend funds on a program only if he can convince Congress to appropriate the money.
When Congress enacted the Boland Amendment, cutting off funds for the war in Nicaragua, Administration officials raised funds for the Contras from other sources╤foreign Governments, the Iran arms sales, and private individuals; and the NSC staff controlled the expenditures of these funds through power over the Enterprise. Conducting the covert program in Nicaragua with funding from the sale of U.S. Government property and contributions raised by Government officials was a flagrant violation of the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution.
The President set the stage by welcoming a huge donation for the Contras from a foreign Government╤a contribution clearly intended to keep the Contras in the field while U.S. aid was barred. The NSC staff thereafter solicited other foreign Governments for military aid, facilitated the efforts of U.S. fundraisers to provide lethal assistance to the Contras, and ultimately developed and directed a private network that conducted, in North's words, a "full service covert operation" in support of the Contras.
╤North's [operation was] required to be disclosed to the Intelligence Committees of Congress under Section 501 of tne National Security Act. No such disclosure was made.
╤By Executive order, a covert operation requires a personal determination by the President before it can be conducted by an agency other than the CIA. It requires a written Finding before any agency can carry it out. In the case of North's [operation], there was no such personal determination and no such Finding. In fact, the president disclaims any knowledge of this covert action. ╤False statements to Congress are felonies if made with knowledge and intent. Several Administration officials gave statements denying NSC staff activities in support of the Contras which North later described in his testimony as "false," and "misleading, evasive, and wrong."
...the Committees reject any notion that worthy ends justify violations of law by Government officials; and the Committees condemn without reservation the making of false statements to Congress and the withholding, shredding, and alteration of documents relevant to a pending inquiry.
... There is no place in Government for law breakers.
Congress & the President..19
Who Was Responsible..20
North
Poindexter
McFarlane
Casey
Bush
Meese
Reagan
+ Part II Central America ch.1╤7
1 Intro: Background on US-Nicaragua Relations..25
The Sandinistas Take Over..27
Tne Contras..27
2 NSC Staff Takes Contra Policy Underground..31
The December 1981 Finding..31
Pastora defects..32
A proposal for a new finding..32
Boland I..32
Admin. Responds to Congr. Unrest: May-Sept. 1983..33
White propaganda..34
office of Public Diplomacy for Lat. Amer & Caribb est.
secret op ed pieces in major papers
The CIA tries to stockpile..34
Sept 1983 finding: a new rationale for covert aid..35
Forcing Issue: Dec. Funding cap & Intensfyng Covert Oper..35
Decision to bring the situation to a head..36
The role of Lt. Col. Oliver North..36
Tension between the 1983 finding & intensified operations..36
Casey urges Pres. seek 3rd country aid for Contras.
Shultz responds that Chief of Staff James Baker had told him that if the US Gov acted as a conduit for 3rd country funding to the Contras, that would be an "impeachable offense."
